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ABSTRACT 
The Principal purpose of this paper is to analyse, the 
mechanics of the legal reforms that would be required to 
enable New Zealand to become a republic. 
The central theme of the paper is that New Zealand has 
matured as a nation to such an extent, that it is a natural 
progression for it to sever its links with the Monarchy. 
The primary focus of the paper will be on the legal 
requirements for establishing a republic here and the form 
that republic should take. 
As part of the analysis the writer will examine the present 
system of Constitutional Monarchy in New Zealand. That 
system appoints by statute, a foreign Queen as Sovereign 
in right of New Zealand and establishes her as the Head of 
State. The paper will also analyse in some detail the role 
of the Governor-General as the representative of the 
absentee Head of State and the appropriateness of that 
role. 
The writer will seek to establish the rationales for reform 
before making a proposal for the structure of the new 
republic and its head of state. In addition, the specific 
' legal reforms that would be involved in establishing the 
structure will be discussed. 
In embarking on the above analysis, it is the writer's 
intention and objective, to develop a practical and 
workable model for a "Republic of New Zealand". The model 
will seek to preserve the best features of the present 
system, under which the Governor-General performs a vital 
constitutional role, whilst relinquishing antiquated 
historical links and traditions. 
LAW LIBRARY 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON 
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STATEMENT OF WORD LENGTH 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, footnotes 
and bibliography) comprises approximately 16,500 words. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
New Zealand is on the verge of embarking on a new chapter 
in its constitutional history. The decision made by 
electors in 1993, in favour of MMP, has already seen the 
formation of numerous new political parties. 1 It has also 
seen splinter groups of Members of Parliament, leaving 
their existing parties to form their own parties, in the 
hope of becoming a minority coalition partner in the next 
government. 2 
In the face of such major change, from the Westminster 
tradition of electing governments by First-Past-the-Post, 
it is, in the writer's opinion, appropriate that other 
historical or inherited links with the United Kingdom be 
reassessed. That includes the issue of the ties 
New Zealand has with the British Monarchy and the issue of 
New Zealand becoming a republic. 
The republican issue has recently been promoted by the 
Prime Minister in a number of public and parliamentary 
speeches. 3 Whilst the issue has yet to gain momentum, the 
fact that it has been propelled into the public arena by 
the Chief Executive is significant. Whether we, the 
public, like it or not, politicians generate change and the 
republican issue is now on the political agenda. 
For Example the United Party, Right of Centre and the Christian 
Democrats within Parliament and Act and the Green Party among 
others outside of the Parliament. 
For Example the resignations of Peter Dunne to form the United 
Party and Graeme Lee to form the Christian Democrats. Both 
parties could be potential coalition partners for the majority 
party following the first MMP election if they are able to 
achieve the 5% vote threshold required under MMP to get seats in 
the House. 
The issue has been raised by Mr Bolger in an Address in Reply 
Speech (see NZPD 8 March 1994) and in an adjournment debate (see 
NZPD 8 December 1994). In addition, it was the topic of an 
address he gave to the Newspaper Publishers Association annual 
meeting on 16 March 1994, made available by the New Zealand 
National Party, 14-19. 
- --.a"'----... ---,~--~ ·- :__'ot'~~~~ ..... ;.-.,.,._l"~~ ...... ~ .-i' ,...,.. -----~ --··- ... 
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To illustrate how the Prime Minister is thinking, the 
following is an excerpt from a speech made to last years 
parliament: 4 
The move to MMP is a very big constitutional change and 
marks a clear break with the British System of Government 
that we have followed thus far. I believe that 
constitutional change is likely to continue as New Zealand 
moves to stake out its own particular identity. It 
is my view ••• it is a personal view not the government's 
view ••• that the momentum for change will gather as we 
identify more with our Asia-Pacific region of the world as 
our direct links to Britain decline. But the big reason 
will be that we want to be independent New Zealanders. 
This will not happen because of any lack of affection or 
love for our Queen in London, but because the tide of 
history is moving in another direction. MMP could prove 
to be the catalyst, given the possible greater role for 
the head of state as we form Governments under MMP. 
The above statement contains a number of ideas and 
identifies several issues relevant to the topic at hand. 
Perhaps of particular interest, is the apparent suggestion 
that, a republic may be a natural progression for 
New Zealand now that MMP is at hand. It is submitted that 
a republic is also a natural progression as New Zealand 
continues to mature as an independent state on the 
international political, economic and cultural stage. 5 
The republican debate has featured prominently in 
Australian politics at times over the last couple of years, 
principally initiated by Prime Minister Paul Keating. 
However, an indication of the serious intent of the 
Australian Government is demonstrated by the establishment 
in 1993 of a Republic Advisory Committee. The Committee 
NZPD Address in reply Speech, 8 March 1994. 
An example of New Zealand's enhanced international status on the 
political stage is our recent appointment and tenure as head of 
the United Nations Security Council. 
6 
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has already reported in detail on the options available for 
constitutional reform, to achieve a viable Federal Republic 
of Australia. 6 
Our own Prime Minister has been accused of borrowing the 
issue to raise his profile. Indeed, an interjection during 
the speech quoted above, by Trevor Mallard, was to the 
following effect: 7 "The Prime Minister has been reading 
Paul Keating Speeches" to which the Right Honourable JB 
Bolger replied: "I do not read Labour Party Speeches." 
Political point scoring aside, the writer is of the view 
that properly promoted, the issue may well become one with 
popular appeal. Accordingly, it is not too soon to examine 
the mechanics of the legal reforms required, to achieve a 
viable democratic Republic of New Zealand. 
Prior to embarking on an analysis of such legal reforms in 
Part II of this paper, it is proposed, in Part I, to 
provide a brief overview of the present position and role 
of the British Monarchy and the Governor-General, in the 
government of New Zealand. In addition, the writer will 
in Part I, discuss some rationales for embarking on what 
is, in reality, major constitutional reform. 
The Report of the Republic Advisory Conunittee: "An Australian 
Republic The Options - The Report" (Australian Government 
Printing Service 1993). 
See Text at n4. 
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PART I: THE NEW ZEALAND CONSTITUTIONAL 
MONARCHY AND RATIONALES FOR CHANGE 
II THE INHERITANCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY 
A. Declaration of Sovereignty 
Although Captain Cook formerly laid British claim to 
New Zealand in 1769, the British Government of the day did 
not take steps to legally acquire the Islands as a colony. 
It was not until 21 May 1840 that Captain Hobson formerly 
declared British Sovereignty over New Zealand. 8 Thus 
New Zealand inherited the monarchy of its European 
Colonisers. 
The new colony was administered by Hobson. He governed the 
colony in the name of Queen Victoria and few, other than 
perhaps the indigenous peopl>;jould have disputed this as 
appropriate at the time. _/ 
However, it will be argued in this paper, that it is . 
entirely inappropriate as we approach the 21st Century, for 
the Queen of England to continue to be the Sovereign in 
right of New Zealand. Furthermore, it will be argued that 
it is inappropriate for her to be the Head of State and to 
have power to appoint a Governor-General, to exercise her 
royal powers on her behalf in New Zealand. 
B. Parliamentary Democracy 
Notwithstanding the arguments that the writer will advance 
The declaration of sovereignty over the North Island was able to 
be made with some confidence by Lieutenant-Governor William 
Hobson following session by northern Maori Chiefs under the 
Treaty of Waitangi, on 6 February 1840. Pursuant to the treaty, 
sovereignty was vested in the British crown. The South Island 
was claimed by virtue of its discovery by Captain Cook. See JB 
Ringer, "An Introduction to the New Zealand Government", Hazard 
Press, Christchurch (1991), 18-20. 
9 
8 
as to the continued relevance and appropriateness of the 
Monarch's present position, the historical position remains 
that, by inheritance through colonisation, New Zealand is 
a monarchy. However, little more than a decade after the 
declaration of sovereignty, the Parliament of the United 
Kingdom passed the New Zealand Constitution Act 1852, 
establishing a "General Assembly" or Parliament to govern 
the colony. 9 That act established New Zealand as a 
constitutional Monarchy. 
From that time New Zealand has developed as a Parliamentary 
Democracy and in reality is a monarchy in name only. 
Although the British Monarch is Head of State and the 
Governor-General is the personal representative of the 
Monarch, they have very limited powers of independent 
action. 10 
By binding convention both the Queen and the 
Governor-General act on the advice given to them by 
Ministers of the Crown. 11 Therefore, except in certain 
limited circumstances (which are discussed below) they do 
not have political powers of governance. 
Accordingly, the power to govern in 
parliamentary democracy lies with 
New Zealand's 
the elected 
representatives of the people. More specifically, it lies 
with the Prime Minister and his cabinet Ministers whom, 
The New Zealand Constitution Act 1852 (UK) was intended to grant 
a representative constitution to the colony of New Zealand. It 
ceased to have effect as part of the law of New Zealand with the 
passing of the Constitution Act 1986. 
10 Historically the Monarch had an almost unfettered prerogative 
power to govern. That prerogative power has progressively been 
eroded over the centuries by the development of Parliamentary 
democracy. See for example the discussion of the Royal 
Prerogative in ECS Wade and EW Bradley "Constitutional and 
Administrative Law" (10 ed Longman, London, 1985) 245-246. 
11 For a more detailed discussion of the conventions surrounding the 
exercise by the Governor-General of her executive functions see 
text below, pp 22-24. 
9 
together with the Governor-General, make up the executive 
arm of Government. 12 
c. The Constitution 
New Zealand does not, as yet, have a single constitutional 
document enshrined in an entrenched and readily accessible 
statute. An all-inclusive document setting out the rules 
and foundation principles determining the way in which a 
state is governed, is a feature of many established world 
republics. A single constitution is not, however, an 
essential ingredient in the republican mix, as will be 
discussed in Part II of this paper. 
It is submitted that the present New Zealand constitution 
can be defined quite readily. The task of putting it in 
a single statute, if desired, would nonetheless be 
considerable. Presently the Constitution of New Zealand 
consists of a number of statutes, formal legal documents 
and well established conventions. 13 In addition, 
law decisions . 14 
it is 
The 
most 
augmented 
following 
by 
is 
a 
a 
number of 
discussion 
common 
and analysis of the 
important, current constitutional instruments, of relevance 
to this paper. 
12 
13 
14 
During the early years of New Zealand's existence as a crown 
colony, governmental and policy making functions were exercised 
directly by the Governor of the day. He might consult the 
elected officials of the government. However, there was no 
convention and certainly no law requiring that he follow any of 
the advice he received which the Governor-General is now bound to 
do. For a discussion of the increasing power of the Prime 
Minister and Cabinet see: R Alley The Powers of the Prime 
Minister, New Zealand Politics in Perspective ( 2nd ed, Paul 
Longman, 1989) pp 103-122. 
For example, 
Electoral Act 
Act 1908 and 
provisions of 
The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, The 
1993, The Judicative Act 1908, The Legislature 
the Official Information Act 1982 each contain 
constitutional importance. 
For example, Fitzgerald v Muldoon [ 1976) 2NZLR 615 clearly 
reinforced parliamentary sovereignty as a constitutional 
principle and re-emphasised the limits of prime-ministerial 
powers. 
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1 The Constitution Act 1986 and the Role of the 
Governor-General 
In basic terms, the Constitution Act 1986, is now the 
foundation document of the New Zealand Constitution. It 
is the principal formal statement of what is now in place 
in terms of the Sovereign, Executive, Legislature, 
Parliament and the Judiciary. 
The preamble to the Act states that it is: 
An Act to reform the constitutional law of New Zealand, to 
bring together into one enactment certain provisions of 
constitutional significance, and to provide that the 
New Zealand Constitution Act 1852 of the Parliament of the 
United Kingdom shall cease to have effect as part of the 
law of New Zealand. 
It is clear from the preamble, that it was the intention 
of the legislators to restate the most basic and important 
constitutional principles or rules . 15 Those rules of most 
relevance to this paper include the following: 
(a) Head of state 
Part I of the Constitution Act deals with the rules 
relating to the Sovereign. Section 2 establishes that the 
15 The Act was partly a response to the need to bring together 
fragmented statutory provisions of a constitutional nature, but 
was principally motivated by a desire to ensure a smooth transfer 
of power after the 1984 constitutional crisis where, to quote the 
then Minister of Justice Geoffrey Palmer, there was: "an 
unwillingness of the outgoing Prime Minister to recommend to the 
Governor-General urgent financial measures that those who would 
form the incoming government saw as essential. Surprisingly 
there appeared to be no means by which the successful party could 
immediately form a government to take responsibility for these 
measures." From: Foreword to Department of Justice, Reports of 
an officials Committee on Constitutional Reform (1986). Section 
6 of the Constitution Act 1986 attempts to ensure a smooth 
transition by providing that a candidate at a general election 
can be appointed as a Minister of the Crown, even though not a 
member of parliament. If on return of the writ in the electorate 
in which the candidate stood, the candidate is not successful ss 
(b) of S.6 provides for the appointment to terminate within 28 
days. 
11 
Sovereign in Right of New Zealand is the Head of State of 
New Zealand. 
The Queen, as the present British Monarch, is Sovereign in 
right of New Zealand by virtue of the actions taken by 
Hobson in claiming sovereignty back in 1840. 
Subsection (2) of S.2 establishes that: "The 
Governor-General appointed by the sovereign is the 
sovereign's representative in New Zealand." 
Other provisions in Part I of the Act, further emphasise 
that the Governor-General is the representative of the 
Sovereign. When the present Queen visits New Zealand, she 
assumes the functions of the Governor-General and the 
Governor-General stands aside. 16 
(b) The Executive Council 
The Executive Council is dealt with under Part II of the 
Constitution Act. The Governor-General is a member and 
usually chair of the Executive Council. The Council 
carries out statutory functions such as the making of 
official appointments and approval of subsidiary 
legislation. 
Other members of the Council must be members of Parliament. 
Although S.6 of the Constitution Act provides for 
continuity of appointment, for up to 28 days, where a 
member loses his or her seat at an election. 17 
Perhaps the most important function of the Council is to 
ensure that the Governor-General has access to ongoing 
ministerial advice. 
16 
17 
Section 3 of the Constitution Act 1986 provides that powers 
conferred on the Governor-General under any act are royal powers 
exercisable by the sovereign in person. 
See n.15 above. 
12 
(c) The Legislature and Parliament 
Further duties or roles for the Governor-General are 
defined in Part III of the Constitution Act. The 
provisions of this part of the Act establish the continued 
existence of the House of Representatives, notwithstanding 
the dissolution of parliament. 18 
Pursuant to S.11 a Member of Parliament must take an oath 
of allegiance to the Queen. Section 12 provides for the 
Governor-General to confirm the appointment of the speaker 
of the House. 
Most important in the context of this paper, are the 
provisions of Sections 14 through to 22. Among other 
things, these provide that the New Zealand parliament shall 
consist of the Sovereign in right of New Zealand and the 
House of Representatives.~ 
They also provide for Royal Assent to a Bill passed by the 
House, 20 for the Governor-General to summon, prorogue and 
dissolve parliament21 and that the Crown may not, except 
by act of parliament, levy tax. 22 
The summoning, proroguing and dissolving of parliament and 
Royal Assent to Bills, are among the more important 
constitutional functions exercisable by the 
Governor-General, as representative of the Head of State. 
In circumstances of constitutional crisis, these functions 
might have to be exercised without ministerial advice. 
When exercised in such circumstances, in a discretionary 
18 Constitution Act 1986 S.10(3). 
19 Ibid S.14(1). 
20 Ibid S.16. 
21 Ibid S.18. 
22 Ibid s.22. 
13 
manner, these functions become what are termed reserve 
powers. The reserve powers are discussed in more detail 
below. 23 
(d) The Judiciary 
Under Part IV of the Constitution Act, the Governor-General 
is given a further function with regard to judicial 
appointment and removal. In this instance the provisions 
of s. 2 3 require that the Sovereign or the Governor-General: 
"act upon an address of the House of Representatives". 
This proviso underlines that the position of the 
Governor-General is, in the majority of instances, subject 
to direct control from elected representatives. 
The Constitution Act 1986 therefore, allocates a number of 
well defined and important functions to the 
Governor-General. The Constitution Act would need to be 
amended, 
transition 
or repealed, for 
to a republic. 
New Zealand 
The matter 
to 
of 
make 
this 
the 
and 
amendments and or repeals of other "Constitutional" 
Legislation will be discussed in more detail in Part II of 
this paper. 24 
2 The Governor-General's Reserve Powers and The Letters 
Patent 
The Governor-General as the Sovereign's representative in 
New Zealand, has at her disposal constitutional powers of 
considerable magnitude. These powers have been 
collectively termed the reserve powers and have been the 
23 
24 
See text below, 13-21. 
By way of example, other legislation that may require repeal or 
amendment include The Judicature Act 1908, The Electoral Act 
1993, The Royal Titles Act 1974 and the Flags Emblems and Names 
Protection Act 1981. The latter statute enshrines in law a 
New Zealand flag incorporating the Union Jack, a symbol that 
reflects our colonial heritage but which is unlikely to have 
continued relevance in a New Zealand Republic. 
14 
subject of quite rigorous academic scrutiny.~ 
The role of the Governor-General is in the main one that 
is titular and ceremonial in nature, with functions and 
powers carried out in accordance with ministerial advice. 
However, the reserve powers are most certainly not of a 
ceremonial or titular nature. The Powers are perhaps best 
defined as what remain of the Monarch's prerogative or 
discretionary power to govern. 26 This royal prerogative 
power was succinctly defined by A Quentin-Baxter in the 
following terms:v 
The royal prerogative comprises the inherent governmental 
powers of the Sovereign recognised by the common law, to 
the extent that they have not been taken away by 
legislation. 
Historically, the English Monarchy was all powerful and 
able to govern in an unfettered way. Over the centuries 
that unfettered power to govern has been rapidly eroded, 
by the rise of the Westminster democratic style of 
government and consequent legislative reform. 28 
25 
26 
27 
28 
See for example: FM Brookfield "No Nodding Automation: A Study 
of the Governor-General's Powers and Functions" [ 1978) NZLJ 491. 
RQ Quentin-Baxter "The Governor-General's constitutional 
discretions : an essay towards a re-definition" (1980) 10 VUWLR 
289 and also A Quentin-Baxter "Review of the letters Patent 1917 
Constituting the Office of Governor-General of New Zealand" 
(Cabinet Office, Wellington, 1980) 116. 
AV Dicey An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the 
Constitution (10 ed, The MacMillan Press Ltd, London, 1975) at 
page 424. The often quoted definition is as follows: "the 
residue of discretionary or arbitrary authority, which at any 
given time is legally left in the hands of the Crown". 
In the Review referred to in n25 above at page 116 para 3. 
For example the Bill of Rights 1688 (Eng) was a fetter placed by 
the people of England on the arbitrary use by the Crown, of its 
prerogative powers. S.l of that Act as printed in 6 Halsbury 
Statutes of England (3rd ed) 490 and quoted by Wild CJ in the 
celebrated case of Fitzgerald v Muldoon [1976] 2N2LR 615 at p619 
states that "the pretended power of suspending of Laws or the 
execution of laws by regall authority without consent of 
Parliament is illegal". 
15 
The reserve powers are rarely exercised but can be 
exercised independently of parliament. Indeed, they are 
exercised over the Parliament of the day by the Sovereign's 
representative and when in New Zealand, could be exercised 
by the Queen herself. 
It is the reserve powers available to the Governor-General 
relating to the legislature that are the particular focus 
of this paper. It should be noted however, that they are 
only one part of the Royal Prerogative, which consists of 
a range of powers, rights, immunities and privileges of 
varying importance. 29 
Some potential reserve powers are derived from statute. 
For example, and as discussed above, 30 The Constitution Act 
1986. Other reserve powers derive from Statutory 
Regulations known as the Letters Patent and in addition, 
some of the powers have their legal source in the common 
law. 
The Letters Patent is subordinate legislation, pursuant to 
which, the office of the Governor-General is constituted. 
There are two regulations currently in force. 31 The 
regulations, among other things, authorise the 
Governor-General to exercise the Monarch's "executive 
29 
30 
31 
The Royal prerogative of Mercy is one example of a prerogative 
exercisable by the Governor-General that does not relate to the 
legislature, With limited exceptions all the prerogatives are 
vested in the executive of the Government for exercise. 
Otherwise they are almost always exercised on advice. 
Above at pages 9 to 13. 
Letters Patent Constituting the Office of the Governor-General of 
New Zealand SR 1983/225 and SR 1987/8. The latter regulation was 
promulgated as an amendment to the former, to address an anomaly 
that arose in respect of the appointment of members of the 
Executive Council, when the Constitution Act 1986 came into 
force. 
16 
authority of "Our Realm of New Zealand. 1132 
That authorisation is prefaced by an injunction that such 
authority is subject to the provisions of the Law of 
New Zealand. Accordingly, therefore, it is statute and in 
particular the Constitution Act 1986, which sets out those 
potential reserve powers of particular relevance to this 
paper. 
It should again be noted that the powers contained in the 
Constitution Act, only take on the nature of reserve powers 
when they are exercised by the Sovereign or her 
representative, using personal discretion. This would only 
occur in exceptional circumstances where, the 
Governor-General was unable to find a minister with the 
confidence of the House of Representatives able to advise 
her. 33 
Some of the more significant powers set out in the 
Constitution Act 1986 and mentioned above, require further 
analysis for the purpose of this paper. These are as 
follows: 
(a) Royal Assent to Bills 
Section 16 of the Constitution Act 1986 provides that the 
signed assent of the Governor-General is required, for a 
Bill passed by the House of Representatives to become law. 
Historically, New Zealand Colonial Governors had a duty not 
32 
33 
SR 1983/225 Clause III(a), The Letters patent also provide for 
the constitution and membership of the Executive Council. It is 
the Executive Councils' function to formally advise the 
Governor-General on behalf of the elected government of the day. 
Professor Brookfield cites as a commonly discussed example, the 
reserve power to dismiss a government that is acting illegally or 
unconstitutionally. Quite clearly the Governor-General could not 
seek advice from that ministry as to its own demise. 
FM Brookfield "The Monarchy and the Constitution Today: A 
New Zealand perspective" (1992) NZLJ 438, 439. 
17 
to disobey the law of the United Kingdom or to disobey the 
instructions of the Crown. Where these duties conflicted 
with the legislative agenda of colonial administrators, 
assenting to a bill might conceivably have become an issue. 
In addition, colonial governors had the power to reserve 
assent and refer the matter to the United Kingdom for the 
Sovereign's assent.~ Notwithstanding the lack of autonomy 
of the early New Zealand legislature, no bill presented for 
assent has ever had that assent refused, then or since. 
There are two examples of Bills passed that were later 
disallowed in 1855 and 1867, but the discretion to refuse 
assent has never been exercised.~ 
Today, Royal Assent to a Bill remains a formality. Section 
16 of the Constitution Act 1986 further emphasises the 
formality of the procedure, in that it does not use the 
word "discretion", which had appeared in the equivalent 
provisions of the New Zealand Constitution Act 1852.~ By 
Convention, the Governor-General is in the words of RQ 
Quentin-Baxter assured by the Attorney General in his 
certificate accompanying the Bill that the "Bill contains 
nothing which requires that his excellency should withhold 
his assent therefrom. " 37 The assent power is therefore the 
least likely to be used on a reserve, discretionary basis. 
~ 
35 
36 
37 
The process has been described by Dicey, where he observed 
however, that: "these assents are constantly given as a matter of 
course" above n26, 104. 
See: McGee D Parliamentary Practice in New Zealand (2nd ed GP 
Publications Wellington 1994) 328-329. 
See: Palmer G "New Zealand Constitution in Crisis Reforming Our 
Political System 1992", J Mcindoe Limited 48-49. Palmer 
expresses the view that were the Governor-General to exercise the 
assent power as a discretion and refuse to follow advice and 
withheld assent "there would be a first rate constitutional 
crisis" at p 49. 
See n25 above, 298. 
18 
(b) Summoning, proroguing and dissolution of Parliament 
Section 18 of the Constitution Act 1986 contains three 
further powers exercisable by the Governor-General. By 
proclamation, she may summon, prorogue or dissolve 
Parliament. 38 These powers were formerly contained in 
clause X of the Letters Patent of 1917. They do not appear 
in the 1983 regulations that replaced the 1917 Letters, as 
the powers have for many years and now continue to vest in 
the Governor-General by statute. 39 
The vesting of those powers by statute, rather than by 
subordinate legislation, is a recognition of their 
constitutional importance. Parliament cannot be dissolved, 
or summoned, without the Governor-General's intervention 
pursuant to these powers. 
Both historically and in practice in New Zealand, the 
powers contained in S.18 have been exercised strictly in 
accordance with the requirements of the Electoral Act 1993 
and ministerial advice. In particular, s. 189 of the 
Electoral Act entrenches S.17(1) of the Constitution Act 
1986, which provides for a three year parliamentary term. 40 
The powers to dissolve or prorogue have never been used in 
New Zealand contrary to the wishes of the government of the 
day. However, Dissolutions prior to the end of the 
statutory term are common, but they are done at the request 
38 
39 
40 
Constitution Act 1986 S18(2). Prorogation differs from 
dissolution in that the former involves discontinuance or 
suspension of the meetings of the legislative body without 
dissolving the same. Parliament is not terminated by prorogation 
as it is when dissolved most commonly as a precursor to a general 
election. 
Ibid SS (1), and see the comments of A Quentin-Baxter above n25, 
13, para 42. 
The Electoral Act 1956 also contains provisions relating to the 
Governor-Generals roles in directing the Clark of the writs to 
issue writs for a general election (s.125) following expiration 
or earlier dissolution of parliament. Dissolution is by 
convention done on the advice of the Prime Minister. 
19 
of the Prime Minister, for the purposes of an early general 
election. 
Independent or discretionary application of those powers 
by the Queen's representative, may occur at times of 
constitutional crisis or deadlock. Examples commonly cited 
by writers on constitutional law, include a government 
refusing to resign after losing a general election, or 
after losing a vote of confidence in the house. 41 
Similarly, a government with majority support that took 
advantage of that position and embarked on unconstitutional 
legislative changes, might expect the sanction of early 
dissolution. 
Complimenting the powers to ~ummon and dissolve, is the 
power to refuse a request for dissolution. This discretion 
might be exercised, where the Governor-General is able to 
ascertain, that there is an alternative power grouping in 
the House capable of forming a government. It is submitted 
that the Governor-General would have to be satisfied that, 
the alternative ministry would be able to command the 
confidence of a majority of the members. 
(c) Appointment and dismissal of the Prime Minister 
There is no statutory provision establishing the office of 
Prime Minister. 0 However, by virtue of clause X of the 
Letters Patent 1983, the Governor-General is empowered to 
appoint all Ministers of the Crown. These Ministers, 
including the Prime Minister, are appointed under the Seal 
of New Zealand "to hold office during pleasure". 
Accordingly the Governor-General has the power to terminate 
41 
42 
See for example HV Evatt and EA Forsey, Evatt and Forsey on the 
Reserve Powers (Legal Books, Sydney, 1990) and the discussion by 
RQ Quentin-Baxter in the article referred to in n25 above, 290-
297 
By convention the Prime Minister is head of the government. 
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the appointment of the Prime Minister at her pleasure, 
theoretically at any time. In actuality, the use of the 
power might only be considered to break a constitutional 
deadlock. 
New Zealand. 
This reserve power has never been used in 
However, termination by a Governor-General 
has occurred in exceptional circumstances in Australia, as 
a result of a constitutional deadlock that arose between 
the lower house and the Australian senate. 43 
A more likely use of the powers in clause X is in respect 
of appointment. Under MMP, as the present Prime Minister 
has observed, there would seem to be an increased 
likelihood of a hung parliament.« If no one party has a 
majority, then the Governor-General's discretion to appoint 
should be exercised in favour of the person most able to 
form a workable coalition. The person that can satisfy the 
Governor-General, that he or she will be able to command 
the confidence of the House. 45 
It is clear from the above analysis that the reserve powers 
are an important constitutional protection against abuse 
of power by elected representatives. It is comforting to 
realise that the powers will rarely, if ever, be required. 
It is even more comforting to know that they are there, if 
and when required. 
43 
« 
45 
The well documented and controversial dismissal by Sir John Kerr 
in 1975 of the then Australian Prime Minister Mr Whitlam arose 
from a constitutional deadlock. The Whitlam government was 
unable to secure passage of its supply bills through the senate. 
The decision by the Governor-General to act was made all the more 
controversial by the fact that the government he dismissed still 
had a majority in the lower house and had not been acting 
unconstitutionally or illegally. For an analysis of this 
dismissal see the article by RQ Quentin-Baxter n25 above. 
See quote in text above, 4. 
M Chen writes that "MMP may require reserve powers to be used 
more often. This will give the Governor-General more 
opportunities to exercise control over the government. See M 
Chern "Remedying New Zealand's Constitution in crisis: Is MMP part 
of the answer?" [1993] NZLJ22, 33. 
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It is submitted that the safeguard of having reserve powers 
in the hands of the head of state must be maintained in a 
New Zealand Republic. In Part II the writer will discuss 
in more detail how this may be achieved, so that this final 
constitutional safeguard can be preserved. 
III CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 
The Reserve Powers are underpinned by a number of 
Constitutional Conventions. These conventions limit the 
opportunity for the Governor-General to exercise 
independent discretion in the application of the powers. 
Dicey defined "conventions of the Constitution" as:~ 
Customs, practices, maxims, or precepts which are not 
enforced or recognised by the Courts that make up a body, 
not of laws, but of constitutional or political ethics. 
Whilst this definition has been the subject of criticism 
by legal writers, 47 it is submitted that it nonetheless 
identifies the fundamental basis for convention, that is, 
customary practice. 
The fundamental convention underpinning the constitutional 
conduct of the Governor-General is that of ministerial 
advice. That is, that the Governor-General will (almost 
without exception) act in accordance with advice given to 
her by the ministers of the crown. The Convention is 
concisely set out in paragraph AS of Chapter 1 of the 
46 
47 
An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution. AV 
Dicey (1975) The MacMillan Press Ltd, 417. 
See for example: Marshall G, Constitutional Convention - The 
Rules and Forms of Political Accountability (1986). Marshall 
points out that conventions have indeed been the subject of 
judicial discussion and recognition. 
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Cabinet Office Manual, where it states that: 48 
The Governor-General, like the Sovereign, acts on the 
advice received from Ministers. This advice is tendered 
either within the forum of the Executive Council, or 
directly to the Governor-General by the Prime Minister or 
another Minister of the Crown. Only in a very few cases 
may the Governor-General exercise a degree of personal 
discretion ( and even then convention usually dictates what 
decision should be taken). 
The last sentence of the above paragraph, is a clear 
reference to the discretionary aspects 
in the 
of 
event 
the 
of Governor-General's reserve powers 
constitutional crisis. It is notable that the manual 
recognises that, even in times of crisis, convention will 
likely, dictate the decision that will be taken by the 
Governor-General.ff 
The Executive Council is the formal organ of government 
responsible for ensuring that the Governor-General is never 
without ministerial advisers. Clause VII of the Letters 
Patent 1983 constitutes the Council. Clause XVIII refers 
to the appointees to the Council as "our responsible 
advisors." 
Those "responsible advisers" must be members of Parliament, 
except in accordance with the limited statutory proviso 
mentioned previously. 50 In practice, they will be 
48 
49 
50 
Cabinet Secretary, Cabinet Office Manual (Wellington 1991) 3. 
For example if a Prime Minister, having lost a vote of confidence 
before the House, refused to resign, there are a number of 
options available to the Governor-General that, by customary 
practice or convention, the Governor-General would almost 
certainly follow. These options include dismissal and the 
calling of an election after dissolution of Parliament. 
Alternatively, the Governor-General might see if there was 
another grouping, able to form a government from within the House 
of Representatives. 
See nlS above. 
ministers of the Government of the day. 
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Acting on the 
advice of those ministers (in the form of recommendations 
to make Orders-in-Council) the Governor-General merely 
carries out the instructions of her Government. 
The office of Governor-General is therefore not one where 
the incumbent exercises independent governmental powers. 
The holder of the office should be and usually is a non-
partisan figurehead representing Queen and country. 51 The 
writer does not, however, underestimate the importance of 
the constitutional role of the office in maintaining 
legitimacy and continuity of Government. 
The supremacy of the elected House of Representatives 
cannot (except in the exceptional circumstances referred 
to earlier in this paper, where the reserve powers might 
be called upon) be challenged or usurped by the 
Governor-General. The role of the Governor-General in 
facilitating the continued legitimacy of Parliament and its 
elected House, is fundamental to the maintenance of the 
rule of law. 52 
IV GOVERNOR-GENERAL'S CEREMONIAL ROLE 
In keeping with the non-partisan role of our present Head 
of State, the Governor-General undertakes a considerable 
51 
52 
However, there have been some controversial appointments. For 
example, Sir Keith Holyoakes' appointment in 1977 by the Queen on 
the recommendation of the then National Government. This was 
seen as politically motivated in some quarters and a departure 
from tradition by virtue of the appointees' previous role of 
Prime Minister and leader of the National Government during the 
late 1960's and early 1970's. 
For example: In dissolving parliament preparatory to a General 
Election the Governor-General takes an active participatory role 
in ensuring the continuance of what Professor Quentin-Baxter 
refers to as" ... the virtue of the triennial Parliament, with 
its frequent and regular appeals to the electorate. This system 
allows minimal opportunities for the development of parliamentary 
situations that were not contemplated by the electorate." Above 
n25, 307. 
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number of ceremonial duties. Such duties include opening 
new sessions of the Parliament and delivering the speech 
from the Throne." In addition, the holding of 
investitures, attending Waitangi Day Commemorations, 
welcoming Heads of State and receiving the credentials of 
foreign diplomats, number among some the more important 
ceremonial duties. 
The Governor-General, it is submitted, should be seen by 
the people of New Zealand as a symbol of Nationhood and 
unity. The position does not and should not, involve the 
incumbent in party politics. Therefore, the holder of the 
office can, through force of his or her own personality, 
be a popular figurehead to the public, regardless of their 
political affiliations or preferences. 
The ceremonial nature of the job also involves the 
Governor-General in a patronage role for many community 
organisations. Such activities should further enhance the 
symbolic nature of the office, as a focus of national unity 
and identity. The Head of State needs to be able to 
represent the nation at home and internationally. It is 
the writers view and one that will be argued in Part II of 
this paper, that the Head of State does not need to 
maintain links with the British Monarchy, to be able to 
successfully fulfil all of the existing constitutional and 
ceremonial roles of the office. 
V THE NEED FOR REFORM 
The Prime Ministers' call for debate on a New Zealand 
53 The speech from the Throne is prepared for the Governor-General 
by the Government and is used to outline the Governments proposed 
legislative programme for the comming session. It is also used 
as a "State of the Nation" statement or review, by and on behalf 
of the Government. See D McGee in above n35, 97-99. This act of 
communication to the House, on behalf of the government, further 
emphasises the titular nature of the office of Governor-General. 
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Republic is unlikely to gather sufficient momentum to 
initiate the reform on its own. There is some validity to 
the argument that the present system of constitutional 
monarchy, coupled with our parliamentary democracy, has 
served New Zealand well. The history of New Zealand is 
largely one of political stability and relative economic 
prosperity. Both are functions, in part, of a system of 
government that works. 
There is, therefore, an issue as to whether such a radical 
reform to our constitutional framework can be justified. 
Is it necessary? Can rationale be established to support 
the proposed reform? 
It is the writer's submission that there are a number of 
indicators that point to a New Zealand Republic being a 
natural progression. Rather than being urgent reasons for 
reform, these indicators highlight the emergence of 
New Zealand as an independent pacific rim nation. 
The first of these indicators is the rapidly changing 
demographics of New Zealand. As each generation passes, 
more and more New Zealanders born on these South Pacific 
Islands, will find it difficult to see the relevance of 
colonial links with the United Kingdom. 
New Zealand has a rapidly growing pacific island population 
in addition to the influx of Asian and other ethnic 
groups.~ Few of these people have strong historical or 
cultural links to the United Kingdom. 
~ The New Zealand Official Year Book 1995 ( 98 ed, Statistics 
New Zealand, Wellington) records that people of Pacific Island, 
Asian and non-European origin now make up over 10% of the 
population and states that: "While the cultural diversity of 
New Zealand is - for the greater part - Eurocentric, the range of 
cultural norms present in New Zealand that have come from non-
European sources, along with existing Maori culture suggest that 
New Zealand will proceed into the next century possessing a wide 
range of different ethnic and cultural values.", 129. 
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The second indicator is our geographic situation. 
New Zealand is physically closer to the nations of the 
Pacific rim than the United Kingdom and Europe. 
Consequently, it looks to this region as an integral part 
of its future and is influenced by its near neighbours in 
both its political and cultural outlook. 
A third indicator can be found in the area of trade and 
economic development. In 1960, the United Kingdom took 53% 
of our total exports. By 1992 the figure was as low as 
6. 5%, a function, partly of Britain joining the EEC and our 
consequent quest for other markets, closer to home. 55 
This trend is highlighted by both the Closer Economic 
Relations (CER) arrangement with Australia and increasing 
involvement in the Asia Pacific Economic Community (APEC). 
The importance of Asia in particular, is emphasised by the 
following statement from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and trade: 56 
there is now a strong consensus in political, business, 
official and research circles [that] New Zealand's best 
economic prospects are in Asia. 
As our nearest neighbour and major trading partner, the 
moves by Australia to consider Republican reform will 
influence the New Zealand body politic. This can already 
be seen in the excerpts quoted above, from a recent 
prime-ministerial speech. 57 It is submitted that as trade 
and economic links with the United Kingdom continue to 
diminish, the relevance of the constitutional links to 
New Zealander's will also diminish. 
55 
56 
57 
See Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade Publication (1992): 
New Zealand Trade Policy Implementation and Directions: A Multi 
Track Approach, 15. 
Ibid 80. 
See text at n4. 
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A further indicator can be found in the continued troubles 
of the Royal Family as aired in the world media. This 
adverse publicity can only increase the calls for change 
and weaken pro-royalist sentiment. Some of the antics 
portrayed, make it plainly embarrassing for New Zealand to 
be associated with the monarchy, no matter how minor its 
role in our government. 58 
Public opinion, fueled by the media is a powerful persuader 
of politicians. New Zealanders are increasingly secure of 
their place in the world and of their identity as a pacific 
rim nation. Change to total sovereignty for New Zealanders 
is inevitable. It is merely the timing and the method that 
needs to be formulated. 
Another and perhaps the most important indicator which the 
writer argues will be a precursor to change, is the recent 
changes to the political environment with the introduction 
of a mixed member proportional representative ( "MMP") 
electoral system. Ever since New Zealand relinquished its 
status as a dominion of Great Britain in 1947, political 
change has moved us slowly but, it is submitted, inexorably 
toward severing all constitutional links with the 
United Kingdom. 
The introduction of MMP, is a major departure from the 
traditional First Past-the-Post system we inherited from 
the British based, Westminster style of government. 
The Prime Minister is clearly of the view that there is an 
increased likelihood of a hung parliament following an MMP 
58 As FM Brookfield commented in above n33, 443: "If republican 
sentiment is probably not, or not yet, strong among New 
Zealanders, royalist sentiment has certainly declined greatly 
over the last forty years since the present Queen's first visit. 
Whatever happens elsewhere, that factor may in the end be enough 
to bring about or at least facilitate the demise of the 
New Zealand monarchy - perhaps after the present Queen, who in 
very many ways has staunchly and successfully upheld the 
institution, has gone." 
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election. 59 Correspondingly he is of the view that there 
will be an increased likelihood that the Governor-General 
might have to exercise reserve powers, as she may be unable 
to determine who are her responsible advisors.~ 
Therefore, the Governor-General is likely to have to use 
her discretions more often. 61 The office will assume much 
greater importance and potential political influence than 
hitherto has been the case. This leads to the central 
issue, it is submitted, as to whether that kind of power 
should continue to reside in the office of a person that 
represents the Monarch of another country? It is the 
writer~ view that it should not and need not. This kind 
of power can and should be exercised by a Head of State 
that derives his or her efficacy directly from the people 
of New Zealand. 
The rationales for change are those indicators discussed 
above. These indicate that the present constitutional 
monarchy is losing its relevance as New Zealand heads 
towards the end of the twentieth century. Relinquishing 
links with the British Monarchy does not necessitate the 
losing of the constitutional safeguards of the present 
system. Part II of this paper sets out how those 
safeguards can be maintained. In simple terms the change 
to a Republic would be a statement by New Zealand of its 
independence and maturity as a nation. 
59 See text at n4. 
60 
61 
Ibid. The Prime Minister envisages a greater role for the Head 
of State "as we form Governments under MMP." The 
Governor-General's responsible advisers are those elected members 
of the House who are able to form a government capable of 
commanding the confidence of a majority of the House. In a hung 
parliament the Governor-General may have to exercise her inherent 
discretion (without advice) to appoint a Prime Minister or 
dissolve parliament and call another election. 
For a detailed analysis of the role of the Governor-General and 
the reserve powers under MMP see C Morris "The Governor-General, 
the Reserve Powers, Parliament and HHP, a New Era" (1995) 25 
VUWLR 1. 
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VI DEFINITION OF A REPUBLIC 
A "REPUBLIC" DEFINED 
Having "set the scene" in the analysis and commentary 
above, the reader will have a background knowledge of what 
is now in place in New Zealand in terms of the 
Constitutional role of the Governor-General. In addition, 
it is submitted that the writer has identified some valid 
rationales for embarking on the proposed reform process, 
toward the establishment of a republic. 
Before embarking on an analysis of the reform process, it 
is necessary to first define what a republic is. The 
Oxford dictionary defines the meaning of the word Republic 
as: 
(a country with a) system of Government in which the 
elected representatives of the people are supreme and with 
an elected head (The President). 
A further definition is provided by the Hutchinson 
Encyclopedia: 62 
A country where the head of state is not a monarch, either 
hereditary or elected but usually a president whose role 
may or may not include political functions 
Whilst simplistic, the above definitions ident{.9"
1
two of 
the most important basic features of a republic. They are, 
firstly, that ultimate power in a republic (in theory at 
least) resides in the voters and secondly, the Head of 
state is elected or appointed and it is not an inherited 
or hereditary position. 
The Australian Republic Advisory Committee used the 
62 The Hutchinson Encyclopedia (2 ed Helicon Publishing Limited, 
Oxford, 1992) 701. 
following definition in its Options report: 63 
A republic is a state in which sovereignty is derived from 
the people, and in which all public offices are filled by 
persons ultimately deriving their authority from the 
people. 
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It follows from the above definitions, that the present use 
by New Zealand of a hereditary monarch, as its head of 
state, must be abolished if republicanism is to be 
embraced. At present, all Members of Parliament are 
elected through a system of universal adult suffrage. Yet 
the sovereign and her representative the Governor-General, 
are not subject to the electoral process. 
B FEATURES OF HISTORICAL REPUBLICANISM 
Writers in the field of political science have commented 
that historically, where a nation embraced republicanism 
it was often a revolutionary repudiation of monarchy. 
Examples cited include the French and American revolutions 
and the Romans, who replaced the collapsed Etruscan 
monarchy with an empire founded on republican principles. 64 
History indicates that when the legitimacy of a hereditary 
monarch is challenged and usurped, there is a real risk of 
anarchy, if the power vacuum is left unfilled. 
Traditionally the proponents of the republican ideal would 
fill the vacuum with popular sovereignty. 
The Sovereignty of the people would be backed by a written 
constitution. The constitution would be used to balance 
the rights of the people by placing checks on the powers 
63 
64 
Above n6, 39. 
s Lawson and G Maddox in an "Introduction to Australian Journal 
of Political Science" (1993) Vol 28 Special Issue on Republic of 
Australia. See also G Maddox in the same publication in an 
article entitled "Republic or Democracy?" 9-26. 
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of those elected to govern them. These checks and balances 
contained in often extensive legal documents, have been 
identified as among the distinguishing historical features 
of a republic. 65 
Most constitutions seek to encapsulate basic freedoms to 
protect the rights of the "sovereign people" of a nation. 
As such they often contain enshrined or entrenched laws, 
which cannot be altered by simple majority vote of elected 
representatives, if at all. 
It is submitted, that for the republic founded by 
revolution rather than by a stable process of reform, a 
written constitution is an essential element. For a 
country like New Zealand, that has basic freedoms in place 
and embarks on planned reform to republican status, the 
importance of a single and extensive constitution is not 
so clear. In the case of the former, the constitution 
represents a new approach to governance. In the latter, 
the changes may be of a more cosmetic nature ( as in 
relinquishing historical ties to a foreign monarchy) and 
the pre-existence of basic freedoms mitigates against the 
need for a single foundation document. 66 
In summary then, the term republic denotes a system of 
government with a number of identifiable features. Some 
of these are indicated by the definitions mentioned above. 
They are the supremacy or sovereignty of the people. An 
elected rather than hereditary head of state and public 
65 
66 
Pettit P 1992 "Republican Themes" Legislative Studies 6 (2) 29-30. 
For example, The Constitution of the United States has in the 
first ten amendments to its constitution, laid down a range of 
rights designed to protect its people from abuse of power by the 
state and guarantee certain basis rights and freedoms against the 
state. The French constitution contains a Declaration of the 
Rights of Man and of the citizen, that dates back to the 
revolution and is intended to guarantee individual rights 
previously denied when the French were governed by its monarchy. 
Both of these countries established republics by revolutionary 
force. 
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officers deriving authority from the people. In addition, 
another important feature of a democratic republic is a 
well defined separation of powers between the state and the 
judiciary. Of utmost importance is the rule, of law backed 
up by the power of the courts to judicially review how the 
state enforces its laws. 
Historically, republics have emphasised people power and 
personal rights. They are a repudiation of monarchical 
systems of rule by the successive generations of one 
family. 
VII REPUBLIC OF IRELAND - A MODEL FOR NEW ZEALAND? 
As a conclusion to Part I of this paper, it is proposed to 
briefly examine the constitutional framework of an existing 
republic. The purpose of such an examination is firstly, 
to use the example to illustrate the basic legal elements 
of a republic and secondly, to identify aspects of the 
model that might be adopted for use in New Zealand. 
The model chosen is that of the Republic of Ireland. The 
basis for choosing the Irish Republic is that it is a 
nation with a Westminster style executive government. In 
addition, it has a non-executive president who fulfils a 
similar role to the New Zealand Governor-General. It also 
has a proportional representation electoral system, 
although using the single transferrable vote, rather than 
the Mixed Member Proportional representation system adopted 
by New Zealand. 
Unlike New Zealand, however, the Republic of Ireland does 
have a single written Constitution.~ Adopted in 1937, it 
67 Bunreacht na hEireann. For a full copy of the Constitution with 
commentary see JM Kelly "The Irish ConstitutionH (2 ed 1987 
Jurist Publishing Co Ltd, University College, Dublin). 
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provides a legal framework within which the state 
government must operate. Additionally, it sets out the 
fundamental rights of the Irish citizen. 68 It also 
establishes a bicameral parliament.~ 
Many features of the Irish system of government would be 
instantly recognisable to students of the New Zealand 
constitution. Those features include an independent 
judiciary, a government which gains its efficacy through 
holding a majority of seats in parliament and a non-
executive head of state, with certain residual 
discretionary powers. 
The Irish Free State was established in 1922, following the 
War of Independence with Britain. The State had dominion 
status and the British Crown continued to be represented 
by a Governor-General until 1936. The 1937 Constitution 
vested executive power in the people "to be exercised by 
or on the authority of the Government" and created the 
off ice of President. 70 At this time, links with the 
English Monarchy were effectively severed. 
The Irish President therefore, replaced the 
Governor-General, but not as a representative of the 
Monarch, rather, as a representative of the Irish people. 
In that representative role, the President of the Republic 
has two functions, those of head of state and guardian of 
the Constitution. It is at this point that the 
similarities with the office of Governor-General in 
New Zealand begin to emerge. 
68 
69 
70 
Articles 40 to 44. These guarantee among other things, personal 
liberty and freedom of expression. 
Article 15. The Irish legislature consists of the Dail or lower 
house, the Seanad (senate) or upper house and the president. It 
has the "sole and exclusive power of making laws for the State". 
Articles 49 and 12 respectively. 
34 
In terms of the role of the Irish president as 
constitutional guardian there are, under the constitution, 
certain powers which the president may exercise 
independently of the government. Among these powers is a 
discretion to refuse a dissolution to a Prime Minister that 
has lost his or her majority in the Dail or Lower House of 
Parliament. 71 It is submitted that this and other 
discretions accorded to the president, are akin to the 
reserve powers available to the New Zealand 
Governor-General. 72 
Another major similarity with the New Zealand office is, 
that except for these seldom used discretionary functions, 
the Irish President must act on advice from his or her 
Ministers. Article 13.9 states that: 
The powers and functions conferred on the President by 
this constitution shall be exercisable and performable by 
him only on the advice of the Government, save where it is 
provided by this Constitution that he shall act in his 
absolute discretion or after consultation with or in 
relation to the Council of State, or on the advice or 
nomination of, or on receipt of any other communication 
from, any other person. 
The Council of state referred to in the above quote 
performs a similar function to the New Zealand Executive 
71 
72 
Article 13.2.2 
The other discretions include power to refer a bill to the 
Supreme Court to test its constitutionality (article 26), to 
convene a meeting of either or both houses of the Legislature 
( article 13. 2. 3), and where a bill is passed without senate 
consent, the president may on receipt of a petition from a 
majority of senators and at least one third of the members of the 
lower house, refuse to sign a Bill into law until the same has 
been approved by a national referendum (article 27). David 
Morgan comments that "It is a tribute to successive Irish 
Governments that Presidents have seldom found it necessary to use 
these powers and have never had to do so in what might reasonably 
be regarded as a crisis. Indeed it is notable that only two of 
these discretionary functions have ever been exercised by the 
President". DG Morgan, Constitutional Law of Ireland: The Law of 
the Executive, Legislature and Judicature. (The Roundhall Press, 
Dublin 1985) 48. 
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Council, in advising the Irish Head of State. Members of 
the Council include both the Prime Minister and his or her 
deputy. Although the President must consult with the 
Council, where the constitution confers a discretion, he 
or she is not bound to follow the recommendations of the 
Council. 
Unlike the New Zealand Governor-General the Irish president 
is elected by direct vote of the people. 73 The term of 
office is seven years and a president may serve a maximum 
of two such terms. 74 A candidate for the presidency must 
either be nominated by a minimum of 20 members of the House 
of Representatives or by the Councils of not less than four 
administrative counties.TI Under Article 12. 10 of the 
Irish Constitution, the President can be impeached for 
"stated misbehaviour" and where he or she exercises a non-
discretionary function, that function can be subjected to 
judicial review. This impeachment power should be 
contrasted with the position of the Governor-General in 
New Zealand. Brookfield observes that the sovereign has 
a reserve power to refuse to dismiss a Governor-General and 
"to reject a Prime Minister's advice that the 
Governor-General be dismissed."% It is submitted that 
there is much greater certainty in a system where the 
process for the removal of the Head of State, is contained 
in a written constitution. 
To summarise, the Republic of Ireland provides a model for 
a republican system of government that could conceivably 
be adopted for ) in New Zealand. It is not suggested 
that it is simv matter of transporting the Irish system 
73 Article 12. 2. 1. 
74 Articles 12.3.1 and 12.3.2. 
75 Articles 4.2 i and ii. 
76 In above n33, 443. 
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of government in its entirety to New Zealand. However, 
there are a number of aspects to the Irish system, which 
could be incorporated in republican reforms in this county. 
In particular, if New Zealand were to sever its 
constitutional links with the monarchy, why not replace the 
Governor-General with an elected President? That President 
would be a non-executive officer with certain residual 
discretions, to safeguard the constitution in times of 
crisis. 
A single written constitution would not be a necessity, nor 
would codification of the reserve powers. The terms of the 
New Zealand constitution are, as has been discussed, 
workable and capable of precise definition, even though not 
contained in a single document. The reserve powers, so 
se1do-m required, are nevertheless able to be described with 
enough specificity from customary practice and conventionr 
to be workable without codification ~ ------
Without doubt, all the Governor-General's functions 
outlined earlier in this paper, could be exercised by a 
republican head of state. The only major difference in the 
constitutionality of the new office is, that the republican 
Head of State would no longer gain his or her efficacy from 
the sovereign monarch. It is submitted that the efficacy 
of the republican head of state would either be derived 
from a sovereign parliament, or directly from the people 
of New Zealand, or a combination of both. 
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PART II: THE MECHANICS OF REFORM 
VIII THE MINIMALIST APPROACH TO REPUBLICAN REFORM 
It is intended in Part II of this paper to focus on an 
analysis of the legal reforms that would be required to 
establish the Republic of New Zealand. The writer will 
look at the policy decisions and instrument choices that 
need to be made, to establish a viable legal framework for 
a republic to function effectively in the New Zealand 
context. 
The writer proceeds from the assumption that the political 
decision to dispense with the Monarch as sovereign, will 
inevitably be made. It will, as discussed, come about as 
a natural function of progress and consequent change in the 
New Zealand pschye. The issue should properly be decided 
by the voters at a referendum, in a similar manner to that 
held for the recent electoral reform. 
Assuming that a majority vote for constitutional change, 
what then are the minimum reforms that would be necessary 
to change to a workable republic? This question was part 
of the terms of reference of the Australian Republic 
Advisory Committee (ARAC} which concluded in its options 
report that:n 
77 
. . . all that is required to convert Australia into a 
republic is to remove the Monarch and implement 
consequential amendments to its governmental system. 
Such a republic would substitute an Australian Head of 
State for the Monarch and the Governor-General, with 
consequential provision being made for the new Head of 
State' s appointment, removal and powers. However, the 
present relationship between the executive government and 
the Governor-General would be maintained essentially 
unaltered. All other institutions of Australian 
See above n6, 40. 
government, the States, Parliament, including the Senate, 
the High Court - and our fundamental constitutional 
principles federalism, responsible parliamentary 
government, the separation of powers, judicial review -
would remain completely unaltered. Those institutions and 
principles need not be altered by the advent of a 
republic, and the model prescribed by the Committee's 
terms of reference would leave them intact and unaffected. 
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This statement of minimum requirements can be readily 
applied to New Zealand. Notwithstanding that Australian 
has both federal and state governance, an extensive written 
constitution and a bicameral House of Representatives, its 
constitutional similarities to New Zealand are clear. It 
is therefore reasonable to conclude that similar minimalist 
reforms could work in New Zealand. Brookfield has likened 
New Zealand to 
Governor-General 
a 
in 
"defacto 
almost all 
republic" 
respects 
with the 
a defacto 
President. 78 A statement of this nature by a leading 
constitutional expert, 
adjustments would be 
tends to confirm that only minor 
needed to turn New Zealand from 
defacto republic, to a republic in fact and at law. 
The minimalist approach has its critics across the Tasman. 
Australians for Constitutional Monarchy (ACM) subscribe to 
the view that you cannot replace the Governor-General with 
an Australian Head of State, without changing the 
fundamental nature of the office.~ The chief concern of 
ACM in its submissions to ARAC, was the effect of a 
republican system on the balance of 
executive and the Head of State. 
power between the 
ARAC rejected this 
concern citing the example of a number of existing 
parliamentary republics and stating that:w 
78 
79 
80 
Above n33, 443. 
Above n6, 41. 
Above n6, 42. The Report concludes that "the choice to become a 
republic has no particular implications for the system of 
government by a newly independent nation". 
Any of the options outlined in this report, if adopted, 
would result in the government of Australia continuing to 
be administered by a ministry responsible to the 
Parliament and commanding a majority in the House of 
Representatives with a largely ceremonial Head of State 
who performs almost all of his or her functions on the 
advice of that Ministry. 
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It is the view of the writer that the minimalist approach 
to change is one that should be adopted by New Zealand. 
Firstly, the minimal changes required (which shall be 
discussed in more detail below) can be accommodated within 
the present constitutional structure. Secondly, adopting 
the minimalist approach is likely to be more acceptable to 
an electorate which has a limited understanding of the 
constitutional issues. Thirdly, having put the initial 
changes in place (by severing links with the hereditary 
monarch and introducing our own Head of State) further and 
perhaps more radical change could be introduced as 
New Zealand society develops. For example, by the 
introduction of a single written constitution and or 
codification of the reserve powers. By opting for the 
necessary minimal reforms, an initial statement can be made 
about New Zealand's maturity and status as an independent 
nation. The fundamental concept of responsible government 
will remain largely unaffected. 
However, even the 
New Zealand Head 
minimal change 
of State for 
of substituting a 
the Monarch and 
Governor-General would be major constitutional reform. 
Accordingly, it would be appropriate for a referendum to 
be held on the issue before a decision to proceed is made. 
As with the MMP referendum, the people of New Zealand will 
need educating as to what remains of our legal ties with 
the Monarchy, to be able to make an informed decision. 
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It is the writer's view that notwithstanding the legal 
position, the real appeal of a New Zealand republic is 
emotive. For a generation of New Zealanders the links with 
the Queen of the United Kingdom must surely be an 
anachronism. A Majority of countries have their own head 
of state representing the people of their nation. Yet, 
New Zealand has an absentee Head of State in the Queen. 
The Queen is by circumstance, unable to perform the normal 
functions of Head of State within her realm of New Zealand. 
Accordingly, she has a representative to perform those 
functions on her behalf. 
The anomaly is, that her representative is appointed on 
advice by the Prime Minister. Furthermore, the 
Governor-General exercises all of the functions of a Head 
of State, but cannot claim the status of head of state. 
Where in that equation, is there a justification for having 
to refer the nominee to the Queen, for approval and 
appointment? 
It is submitted that the people of New Zealand will come 
to understand that there is no constitutional necessity to 
retain the Queen as an absentee head of state. The link 
with the British Monarch is merely a symbolic relic of an 
old world order. More than that, there is for New Zealand, 
the emotive issue of what amounts to a continuing 
aberration on its status as an independent nation. 
IX IMPLEMENTATION OF MINIMAL REFORMS 
The writer contends that a majority of New Zealanders could 
be convinced as to the merits of establishing a republic. 
If, at a national referendum (assuming that this would most 
likely be the method used) a major tty voted for change, 
\...--· 
what are the legal reforms that would need to be 
implemented? 
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The minimalist approach outlined above principally involves 
bringing an end to the constitutional monarchy of 
New Zealand. In addition, it involves establishing a new 
office for the New Zealand head of state and putting in 
place rules and procedures for the governance of that 
office. 81 
A. The New Head of State 
Before analysing the specific law changes that would be 
required to relinquish existing ties to the British 
Monarchy, it is proposed to look at the options for a new 
head of state. Clearly, the position of head of state is 
central to any discussion of republican reform. Removal 
of the monarch as Head of State, without having a viable 
replacement, would be a dangerous and foolhardy 
constitutional experiment. That is particularly so as we 
approach the first MMP general election, a system that is 
expected to place greater emphasis and importance on the 
office of the Governor-General. 
The importance of the off ice of head of state as a 
constitutional guardian, is sufficiently well established 
historically and legally, not to require further discussion 
here. It is notable that ARAC received over four hundred 
submissions and of these, only 26 advocated abolition of 
the office of head of State, a proposal rejected by the 
Committee. 82 
Therefore, before a decision is taken to abandon the 
constitutional monarchy, a proposal for a functional 
81 
82 
The Report of the Australian Republic Advisory Conunittee briefly 
examined and rejected the option of dispensing with both the 
Monarchy and with the Head of State. The basis for the rejection 
was the significance placed by the conunittee on the importance of 
the role a Head of State takes in maintaining checks and balances 
on the power of the executive. Above n6, 50-51. 
Above n6, 47 and see also above n81. 
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alternative head of state needs to be developed. It is the 
writer's view that there are three major elements to the 
new office which require consideration. They are, a 
general position description, appointment and removal and 
the powers to be allocated to the office. 
1 A position description for the new Head of State 
A strictly minimalist approach to reform might dictate that 
the new head of state would simply fulfil the same role as 
the existing Governor-General. That approach does not take 
into account the fundamental change in the role that will 
occur with removal of the monarch. The Head of State will 
no longer be a representative of the monarch, but Head of 
State in his or her own right. 
It is therefore possible that the Head of State in a 
New Zealand Republic could seek to exert political 
influence, by virtue of this fundamental change. The 
implications of the higher profile of the new office in 
terms of the powers to be allocated to the Head of State 
will be discussed below. 
Notwithstanding the likely higher profile of the office, 
if New Zealand does follow a minimalist approach to the 
reform process, many of the present elements of the office 
of Governor-General will be duplicated in the new office. 
However, this should not apply to the title of the office. 
In keeping with the move away from the constitutional 
monarchy, to a republic, it is submitted that the most 
appropriate title for the new position is that of 
"president". Just as the term Governor-General is 
synonymous with monarchy, conversely, "President" is the 
commonly used title for a republican head of state. 
The position description for the President of the Republic 
of New Zealand should contain a number of general 
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requirements, as base indicators of the type of role to be 
performed. The first of these requirements is that the 
President is a non-executive head of state. That is, like 
the Irish President and the present Governor-General, the 
New Zealand President must act on the advice of the 
Ministers of his or her government and will not have actual 
political power. 
Secondly, the president will carry out a variety of 
ceremonial and representational functions, at national and 
international level, on behalf of the New Zealand 
government and New Zealanders. Again, this is a range of 
functions similar to those carried out by the 
Governor-General. However, the increased profile of the 
office may lead to a greater representational role for the 
President internationally, for example in promoting 
New Zealand's economic interests overseas. 
Thirdly, the position of President must be non-partisan, 
in order for the incumbent to be able to effectively 
exercise constitutional guardianship functions. This 
requirement would not be intended to exclude persons with 
a political background from assuming office. More 
importantly, the method of appointment would need to be 
carefully formulated, to reduce the opportunity for 
politicisation of the position. 
2 Appointment and removal of the President 
The method of appointment and removal of the President 
requires careful consideration if politicisation is not to 
occur. The present method of appointment of the 
Governor-General by the Queen, on advice of the Prime 
Minister, is open to the criticism that such appointments 
are indeed political. With the removal of the monarch, 
that method will of course be redundant. However, the 
minimal change option of leaving the decision of both 
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appointment and removal with the Prime Minister and his 
government alone, has little appeal. Such a method would 
not sit easily with either the non-partisan nature of the 
position, or the likely greater emphasis on consensus 
decision making with the advent of MMP. 
The Prime Minister, in his address to the 1994 annual 
conference of the Newspaper Publishers Association, stated 
that "the options would seem to be either a general vote 
of all electors or election by an electoral college. " 83 
Similarly, submissions to ARAC favoured parliamentary 
appointment, popular election or appointment by an 
electoral college. 
It is submitted that there is no right answer as to the 
best method of appointment or removal. However, in the 
model of the Republic of Ireland discussed above, popular 
election has been successfully employed for over half a 
century to choose its head of state. 
There are problems inherent in both parliamentary 
appointment and the electoral college option. For example, 
both exclude direct voter involvement and the former may 
lead to conflict between the government and opposition 
parties as to the best candidate, especially if a special 
majority (for example two-thirds of the House) was 
required. Furthermore, the latter option of an electoral 
college would inevitably lead to concerns and controversy 
over its membership, that is, the issue of who should or 
should not be represented on the college. 
The primary criticism of the electoral option is the 
concern that a President, with the popular mandate of a 
majority of votes, may become too powerful. He or she 
might be encouraged to attempt to enter the political arena 
83 See above n3, 17 
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in competition with the government, especially if backed 
by a greater majority in voter support than that 
government.M It is the writer's view that the President 
of New Zealand will rightly have a greater national and 
international status than the Governor-General presently 
enjoys. However, politicisation of the new office can be 
avoided by adequately defining (as in Ireland) and limiting 
the powers of the office. 85 
The scope of this paper does not allow for a detailed 
assessment of each of these options. Rather, it is the 
writer's intention to formulate a basic framework for a 
workable New Zealand Republic. Accordingly, having 
reviewed the ARAC report in the light of the political and 
legal circumstances pertaining to New Zealand, it is the 
writer's view that appointment by popular election, would 
be an acceptable option for New Zealand. Furthermore, it 
is clearly within the contemplation of the Prime Minister. 
In keeping with the Irish model, it is submitted that 
nomination of a suitable candidate or candidates, should 
require the backing of at least 20 members of parliament. 
If the post MMP political parties are able to agree to the 
nomination of a single candidate, then the need for an 
election can be avoided, with consequent cost savings. In 
Ireland the non-partisan nature of the office has lead to 
five single candidate appointments, without a poll, since 
1937. 86 
The term of appointment should be six years to ensure 
84 
85 
86 
See for example the comments of the ARAC n6 chapter S, 64-74. 
The ARAC report took the view that if popular election is the 
method chosen for selection the powers of the head of state would 
have to be clearly defined and limited in the constitution "so 
that the Australian people know precisely the powers and duties 
of the heads of state they are being called upon to elect." 
Above n6, 72-73 
See DG Morgan above n72, 52. 
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continuity of office and to allow for the presidential 
election to coincide with every second general election. 
The incumbent President should be able to stand for 
re-election for a second term, with a two term maximum 
tenure of office. 
As far as qualifications for the off ice are concerned, 
there appears to be no good reason to depart from the Irish 
practise. Therefore the qualifications for President of 
the New Zealand Republic would be a New Zealand citizen 
aged 35 years or over. The President should not be allowed 
to hold any other office during his or her tenure and if 
a Member of Parliament when elected, must vacate that 
position. The selection process should ensure that only 
suitable candidates are nominated, presumably with the 
necessary eminence and acumen to be able to carry out the 
constitutional and ceremonial functions attaching to the 
office. 
Provision for removal of the President outside of the 
electoral process will be an essential part of the reforms. 
At present the power to remove the Governor-General may 
only be exercised by the Queen. The power would be 
exercised upon recommendation of the Prime Minister. 
In order to preserve the impartiality of the office, the 
President should not be subject to removal at the arbitrary 
discretion of the Prime Minister and his government. The 
writer supports the view taken by ARAC where the committee 
stated that there is "a good case .•• for parliamentary 
removal of a popularly elected head of state, provided 
there was a special majority requirement which ensured a 
bipartisan result."n In the Irish Republic the President 
can be impeached for "stated misbehaviour" and ARAC 
submissions refer to grounds of "misbehaviour or incapacity 
87 ARAC Report above n6, 81. 
47 
or acting contrary to the constitution. 1188 Whatever the 
specific grounds decided upon, it is submitted that before 
parliament {by two-thirds majority) is permitted to remove 
the President, there should be a constitutional requirement 
for the matter to be referred {also by vote of a majority 
of the House) to an independent judicial body. That body 
would decide whether the grounds for removal have been 
established beyond a reasonable doubt. 
3 Powers and Functions of the New Zealand President 
The off ice of President will, like that of the 
Governor-General, be a non-executive one. In accordance 
with the minimalist approach advocated by the writer it can 
be concluded that only those powers and functions presently 
exercised by the Governor-General should be given to the 
non-executive President. All such powers to be exercised 
on advice, with limited exceptions as discussed below. 
Therefore, using the Constitution Act 1986 as a str ing 
point, the President would continue to have the power to: 
confirm the appointment of the speaker of the House; sign 
a Bill passed by the House into law; summon, prorogue and 
dissolve Parliament and remove a judge of the High Court 
from office. 
The Letters Patent will need to be revoked as discussed 
below. However, certain powers and functions allocated to 
the Governor-General under these regulations should be 
retained for execution by the President. The Executive 
council should be retained to ensure the President has 
continued access to ministerial advice. In addition, the 
power to appoint the members of the Council, Ministers of 
the Crown {including the Prime Minister) and to exercise 
the prerogative of mercy should be placed in the hands of 
88 CF: The Irish Constitution Article 12.10.1. and above n6, 75-76. 
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the President. 
In terms of the Electoral Act 1993, the President should 
also continue to execute the power to direct the Clerk of 
the Writs, to issue writs for the general election, as 
required under S129 of that Act. 
All of the above powers could be transferred to the 
President without effecting the present balance of power 
between the executive, parliament and the judiciary. The 
powers are, after all, only those powers already exercised 
by the representative of the Head of State. These are 
powers which have for many years assisted in the 
maintenance of stable government. There is no reason to 
anticipate that this will change just because they are 
vested in the new office of President. 
The President would continue to fulfil all the ceremonial 
and representative roles now performed by the 
Governor-General. The notable exception being of course, 
that he or she will no longer represent the Queen as 
Sovereign and absentee Head of State. 
X CODIFICATION OF THE RESERVE POWERS 
The President should still retain the power to exercise the 
role of guardian of the constitution in times of crisis. 
To facilitate this, the reserve powers available to the 
Governor-General should be transferred to the new head of 
state. 
The concept of an impartial final arbiter, to resolve a 
constitutional deadlock where the parliamentary government 
has malfunctioned, sits well with the concept of democracy. 
This statement has validity whether the democracy concerned 
is a constitutional monarchy or an autonomous republic. 
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The power to take positive action against constitutional 
abuse by an elected government, must be available to the 
President as a last resort. No other official, or body, 
is better placed to protect the normal functioning of 
parliamentary democracy in times of crisis than the head 
of state. This point has been illustrated by the conduct 
of a number of heads of state at such times throughout the 
commonwea 1 th. 89 
The New Zealand President would, as an elected head, have 
a clear mandate from voters to underpin his authority as 
a constitutional guardian. This mandate, together with the 
non-partisan nature of the office, means the President 
(like the Governor-General) is best placed to intervene 
where there is an issue of constitutionality requiring 
resolution. 
If the President is to retain reserve powers, the issue 
then raised is how these may be vested in the new office 
and in what form. Do the powers require partial or 
complete codification, or should the conventions governing 
exercise of these discretions remain unwritten? 
In respect of the issue of codification the writer again 
submits that the best option is the minimalist approach to 
reform. That approach dictates that the minimum change 
would be to leave the reserve powers underpinned by 
conventions, but without statutory codification. 
As previously stated, there is a substantial body of 
writing on this issue by scholars of constitutional law.~ 
Some favour codification of the reserve powers for reason 
of certainty, enforceability and the benefit of judicial 
89 
~ 
See the examples discussed in the ARAC report above n6 and the 
analysis of the Kerr dismissal of the Whitlam Government by RQ 
Quentin-Baxter in n25 above, 298-391. 
See above n25. 
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review and interpretation. 91 Others oppose codification 
because of the need for flexibility in the development and 
application of the powers, to a dynamic political and 
constitutional landscape.n 
Having evaluated the opposing views and reasoning behind 
them, the writer is of the opinion that statutory 
codification would not assist with the better functioning 
of a New Zealand Republic. The fundamental reason for 
reaching this conclusion is clear from the writing of those 
commentators that oppose codification. That is the need 
for flexible powers. 
In the unlikely event (even with the advent of MMP) that 
the President of the new republic would be called upon to 
exercise a reserve power, it is submitted that it would be 
preferable that the scope and flexibility of the discretion 
was sufficient to be able to adequately resolve the crisis, 
in whatever form it may take. The following statement by 
Dr Forsey clearly identifies the central problem with 
codification: 93 
91 
92 
93 
To prevent disputes, a more general statement would be worse 
than useless. Almost the whole field of argument would be left 
wide open. Precision, detail, comprehensiveness are 
indispensable. A law covering, with precision, all the possible 
circumstances which might call for the exercise of even a single 
reserve power, let alone the lot, is surely beyond the wit of 
even the most learned and imaginative draftsman. There are 
bound to be loose ends. Many of the new constitutions, as we 
have seen, leave the Governor-General with considerable 
discretion. Also any formula the draftsman may produce will 
risk giving the Crown or its representative either too much 
power or too little. 
The best known proponent being HV Evatt see above n41. 
See Dr Forsey in his introduction in above n41. 
Above n41, xxxiii. 
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Statutory codification of the reserve powers would run the 
real risk of giving the President too little power to 
resolve a constitutional deadlock. Instead, it is 
submitted that the existing powers be vested in the 
President and augmented by a restatement and redefinition 
of the conventions underpinning their exercise. 
This restatement and redefinition could, as suggested by 
Professor Quentin-Baxter be agreed to by a resolution of 
the House of Representatives. 94 The content of the 
restatement could reflect (with amendment by deletion of 
the references to the Governor-General and the Queen and 
substitution of "President" therefor) the conventions as 
set out by the professor, in the conclusion to his paper. 
In addition, new conventions could be included that would 
better meet the possible constitutional dilemmas that may 
require resolution under an MMP parliament. 
95 
Alternatively, or in addition, the resolution of the House 
could be set out in the Cabinet Manual which, as discussed 
earlier, already sets out the convention of ministerial 
advice. 
It is notable that the ARAC options report favoured some 
form of codification, probably within the existing 
Australian constitution. This approach appears to be based 
on the concern that leaving the discretionary powers 
undefined would leave the head of state with potentially 
autocratic powers. It is the writer's view that extra-
statutory codification of the conventions as proposed above 
would mitigate against abuse of the reserve powers by a 
New Zealand President. Were the President to attempt to 
94 
95 
See above n25, 314-315. 
For a discussion of these new "MMP" dilenunas see the discussion 
by Caroline Morris in above n61. On page 22 of the article 
Morris proposes three new conventions to underpin exercise by the 
Governor-General of her powers to refuse a request for a 
dissolution of Parliament and to appoint a Prime Minister in the 
MMP environment. 
52 
exercise his discretion in a manner that clearly breached 
any one of the conventions adopted by resolution of the 
House, the sanction of impeachment would be available.% 
XI ABOLITION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY 
writer identified the 
In Part I of this paper, the 
principal elements of the 
particularly in relation to 
New Zealand constitution, 
the Head of State and 
proposed to analyse the 
Governor-General. It is now 
minimum changes that would be required to New Zealand 
constitutional law, to facilitate republican reform. 
The scope and length of this paper does not allow for a 
detailed examination of all the legislative changes that 
would have to be made. There are numerous statutes on the 
books which contain provisions referring to the sovereign 
monarch, her Governor-General and the Crown. A general 
review of all statutory provisions would be necessary, to 
establish the amendments required to remove references to 
the old order and substitute by amendment or revocation the 
new republican structure. 
The task of abolishing the monarchy would be achieved by 
an Act of Parliament. As professor Brookfield has 
observed: 97 
96 
97 
• • • Parliament in exercise of its plenary powers could 
readily abolish the monarchy; though the Governor-General 
could properly query ministerial advice to assent to the 
measure for abolition, unless it had general parliamentary 
support, or had been endorsed by a referendum of the 
electors. 
See text above 48-49. 
Above n33, 444. 
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The Governor-General would have no reason to query advice 
to assent if, as proposed in this paper, the abolition has 
been voted for in a national referendum. 
A Revocation of the Letters Patent 
The Letters Patent Constituting the Office of 
Governor-General would need to be revoked simultaneously 
with the passing of the legislation removing the monarch 
as head of state. Clause XVIII of the Letters of 1983 and 
Clause II of the Letters of 1987, reserve the power of 
revocation to Her Majesty the Queen, personally. 
Accordingly, a new letter would need to be issued in the 
form of a statutory regulation. The new letter or 
regulation would by Her Majesty's command, revoke the 
existing regulations pursuant to Clauses XVIII and II 
respectively of the 1983 and 1987 regulations. This would 
have the effect of terminating the office of 
Governor-General and the right of that officer to exercise 
the monarch's executive authority in New Zealand. Such 
revocation would also abolish the Executive Council. 
B Amendment to the Constitution Act 1986 or a new 
Constitution? 
In keeping with the minimalist approach to reform as 
proposed by the writer, it would not be necessary for a 
lengthy formal constitution to be adopted for New Zealand 
to make the transition to a republic. In fact, because 
there is no entrenched constitutional document the process 
would be simpler for New Zealand than Australia. The ARAC 
Report confirmed this by noting that a Constitutional 
Amendment Bill would have to be passed by an absolute 
majority of both Houses of Parliament. Furthermore it 
would then be referred to a referendum of the people of 
LAW UBRARY 
VICTORIA YNI\IE:Fi9lTY OF WELLINGTON 
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Australia. 98 
That is not to say that New Zealand would not benefit from 
a single written constitution. Such further reform is not 
within the scope of this paper. However, it is not 
inconceivable that having adopted the minimal reforms 
proposed by the writer and become a Republic, that 
New Zealand would take the further step of fully 
documenting its constitutional laws. Such a document would 
incorporate the basic tenants of our system of government. 
It is possible that such a document, like the Irish 
Constitution discussed above, could be used as a means of 
codifying some of the discretionary powers of the 
New Zealand President.~ The decision to embark on this 
more radical reform, would be dependant on the evolutionary 
success, or otherwise, of the initial republic. 
It is not necessary for the New Zealand Republic to embrace 
such immediate and radical change. The difference between 
the Irish reforms and those proposed for New Zealand is 
that the former embraced republicanism at a time of 
political upheaval and conflict. The impetus for radical 
change came from the oppressive colonial rule of the 
British. New Zealand has no such impetus for radical 
reform. Instead, it has a long tradition of stable 
democracy. Accordingly, the approach of initial minimal 
reform, although conservative, is appropriate. If 
subsequently it is decided the functioning of the new 
republic would be assisted by an entrenched constitution, 
such legislation can be introduced. 
The drafters of such a constitution will have the advantage 
of having been able to observe the workings of the republic 
98 Above n6, 117. 
99 see the discussion in the Text above, n34 and n72 . 
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in the New Zealand political and constitutional 
environment. They will therefore be able to make 
adjustments to "fine tune" the system, before such matters 
become entrenched in the provisions of the new 
constitutional document. 
In the absence of a New Zealand constitution therefore, the 
minimalist approach will require amendment to the 
Constitution Act 1986. A Constitution Amendment Act would 
need to be passed by the House and by way of example, the 
following are some of the likely amendments: 
1 The Head of State 
Part I of the existing Act would need to be revoked in its 
entirety. The effect would be to remove the reigning 
British Monarch as the sovereign in right and Head of State 
of New Zealand. It would also remove reference to the 
Governor-General as the sovereign's representative, the 
appointment of the Governor-General having been revoked 
with the revocation of the Letters Patent. 
The amending legislation would then establish the President 
as head of state. It would also have provisions dealing 
with the method of appointment (by election) and removal 
in the terms discussed above. 100 
Because the act of abolition is of such constitutional 
significance, it would be appropriate for the amending 
legislation to have a suitable new preamble, setting out 
the nature of the reform. It is suggested that such a 
preamble may be in the following form: 
100 
An Act to reform the constitutional law of New Zealand and 
in recognition of the development of New Zealand as an 
independent nation devoted to the principles a 
See text above 48-49. 
parliamentary democracy to abolish the monarchy and 
establish New Zealand as an independent republic. 
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Any other formula of wording that conveys the above 
intention would be acceptable. The important point is, 
that the statement be clearly made to the nation and 
internationally. Part I of the amending legislation should 
be equally unequivocal as to its purpose. That is, in 
amending the sections in Part I of the Constitution Act 
1986, there should be a provision that clearly states that 
the Constitutional monarchy is abolished. 
2 The Executive and the Legislature 
Part II of the Amendment Act would need to deal with the 
establishment of an Executive Council to advise the 
President, in the manner that the present Council advises 
the Governor-General. 101 Section 6 of the existing Act, 
allowing for continuity of appointment after a general 
election and that Councillors must be members of 
parliament, need not be amended. 
Similarly sections 8 and 9 would remain without amendment 
save for substitution of "President" for references to the 
Governor-General in respect of the appointment of 
parliamentary under-secretaries. Also, Part III relating 
to the legislature would not require amendment except that, 
the President would confirm the appointment of the speaker. 
3 Parliament 
Section 14 of the Act would require amendment to state that 
the parliament of New Zealand will consist of the President 
of New Zealand and the House of Representatives. Section 
16 would have the President inserted, as the officer to 
101 The Executive Council having been abolished with the revocation 
of the Letters Patent. 
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exercise the function of assenting to Bills passed by the 
House. 
In terms of the summoning, proroguing and dissolution of 
parliament, these functions would be exercised by the 
President, with S18 being amended accordingly. 
As part of the overall package of reforms, there would need 
to be a provision inserted in the Constitution Amendment 
Act preserving the prerogative ( common law) powers and 
immunities of the Crown. The intention would be to ensure 
that the executive government of the new republic would 
continue to have the same powers and immunities that extend 
to the present executive government. 
The ARAC Report at page 147, contains a draft provision 
preserving these immunities and powers following abolition 
of the monarchy. It is submitted that it could be adapted 
for use in the Constitution Amendment Act as follows: 1m 
Subject to this Act, abolition of the Monarchy in itself 
shall not affect any power, function, right, privilege, 
inununity or prerogative derived from the royal prerogative 
and exercisable by the government of New Zealand. 
The above analysis is intended only to be an example of the 
specific statutory reforms that would be required to bring 
about the proposed minimum changes to the constitution of 
New Zealand. Although the proposal is for a minimalist 
approach, the scope of the reforms required is still 
considerable if a viable republic is to be achieved. 
Undoubtedly, before any government could make a decision 
to call for a referendum, a committee similar to that 
established in Australia would be required to report in 
Im This is an adaption by the writer of a draft amendment to the 
Australian constitution proposed by G Winterton; "A constitution 
for an Australian Republic" Independent Monthly, March 1992, 10 
and quoted in the ARAC report. 
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detail on the options. 
XII CONCLUSION 
More than five years after its sesqui-centenary and rapidly 
approaching the 21st century, New Zealand still retains 
antiquated links with the British Monarchy. The time has 
come for a peaceful and positive revolution, by moving to 
the absolute autonomy of a democratic republic. 
The Prime Minister has suggested that the beginning of the 
new century would be an appropriate starting date for the 
New Zealand Republic.~ If that is the intention, then 
planning should start without delay, as there is much work 
to be undertaken to ensure that the reform process is fully 
worked through. 
In the course of this paper the writer has analysed the 
primary reforms required to establish a viable republic in 
New Zealand. In particular, the discussion has focused on 
the minimum changes that would need to be undertaken to 
make the transition from constitutional Monarchy to 
democratic republic. Although the minimalist approach to 
reform has been proposed, the scope of the law changes 
involved remains considerable. 
The first stage of the process must be, as observed by the 
Prime Minister, to bring together a group of constitutional 
law experts to explore the options for reform. 1~ If it 
is then decided to proceed, the matter would be put to the 
vote by referendum, to find out the level of support for 
a move to a republic. 
103 
1~ 
In his speech to the Newspaper Publishers Association see above 
n3, 18. 
Ibid. 
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In the event that New Zealanders vote in the affirmative, 
the writer has proposed a reform process involving an 
elected, non-executive President. The new Head of state 
would serve for a six year term and be eligible for 
re-election, for one further term, unless removed by a 
special majority vote of the House of Representatives. 
The powers of the President should be exercised on advice 
of the executive members of the elected government. Those 
powers would be equivalent to those presently exercised by 
the Governor-General, with the same reserve powers 
necessary to enable the President to act as a guardian of 
the constitution. 
The reserve powers would not be subject to statutory 
codification. However, the constitutional conventions 
relating to their application would be identified and or 
redefined by resolution of the House. In addition, they 
could be set ou~ in the Cabinet Office Manual, to provide 
some greater certainty of application, without diminishing 
the flexibility of the discretions to adapt to a range of 
constitutional crises. 
The initial reform would not require the drafting of a 
New Zealand Constitution, although this further reform 
option would always remain available. Instead, existing 
constitutional legislation (in particular the Constitution 
Act 1986) would need to be amended and the Letters Patent 
Constituting the Office of the Governor-General, revoked. 
If a decision is taken to become a republic, it should be 
for the positive reason that it is a natural progression 
toward complete autonomy. The people of New Zealand should 
remain justifiably proud of their heritage and the stable 
system of government it has given them. 
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